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Political theology or cult of modernity?

An interpretation of Peter Thiel's views

An overview of theoretical influences

Peter Thiel is an influential American entrepreneur, known for his eclectic tech investments, and a major sponsor of current U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance. He is also making a name for himself as a theorist. I will focus in particular on his 'political theology', which is spread across a diverse and piecemeal range of texts and speeches. I will briefly discuss some of his key theoretical references before offering some critical reflections.

The cornerstone of Thiel's education was French anthropologist and theologian René Girard, whom he met at Stanford University while studying law. Girard seems to have introduced Thiel to the model of the integral Catholic intellectual; his frequent advice, as Thiel recounts (Hoover Institution, 2024), was 'to go to church', labelling religious devotion the remedy for all human uncertainty. Thiel declares himself a Lutheran Christian. But Girard would, above all, pass on his model of social an-

thropology, which Thiel would integrate so radically that all of his subsequent thinking seems to have been definitively conditioned by it: the mimetic nature of desire¹ and the violent social rivalry that ensues; the scapegoat mechanism that restores balance and pacifies archaic societies; Judeo-Christian difference from archaic myths, which is oriented toward knowledge of the victim and dismantles the mythical order and its oppressive dynamics from within; and the risk that, in today's societies, unchanneled mimetic rivalry will inevitably lead to an apocalypse; these form the web of fundamental truths bequeathed to Thiel by his master, which provides a foundation for any further reflection.

Thiel read other authors, including Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, John Locke, Oswald Spengler and the medieval philosophy of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, but strictly to the extent that they intertwined with and deepened his Girardian theoretical

framework. He then reflected on the theme of violence and political conflict in the wake of the friend-enemy distinction (Carl Schmitt); he became fascinated by the esoteric and elective nature of knowledge and the need for social control (Leo Strauss); he studied and criticized what he considered the American liberal theoretical model (John Locke), all within the overall framework of a diagnosis of the inexorable decline of the West (Spengler). More periodically, Thiel cites authors such as Ivan Illich, Gramsci and specifically Machiavelli, whom he read through Strauss. Last but not least, Thiel resonated with the digital intellectual circle of Silicon Valley bloggers, embodied by Curtis Yarvin with his fiercely critical positions on democracy and the Enlightenment.²

According to Thiel, the Enlightenment universally propagated modern political rationalism. Together with the consequent spread of atheism and dis-

¹ Mimetic desire, the conceptual core of René Girard's work, first appeared in his book *Deceit, desire and the Novel. Self and other in literary structure* published in France in 1961. His theory revolves around the fact that desire for an object arises from seeing someone else desire it. In a nutshell, he argues that our desires are not innate but derive from imitating others. This view of desire leads to a scenario of inevitable violent rivalry. Social pacification and its stability depend on how this violence is mediated. The scapegoat mechanism in archaic societies characterized by ritual sacrifices constitutes a strategy of social pacification, while Judeo-Christian culture advances a knowledge of the victim, breaking this dynamic.

² Thiel's critique of the Enlightenment is also due to the theoretical influence of Curtis Yarvin, an American software engineer and blogger under the pen name Mencius Moldbug and founder of a movement called *Dark Enlightenment* or the neo-reactionary movement (NRx), an anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian, reactionary philosophy, developed further by English philosopher Nick Land <https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/dark-enlightenment/>. Curtis Yarvin's pioneering political proposal to awaken humanity from its democratic slumber would be a return to monarchy headed by CEOs, who, with their unrivalled proactivity in problem solving and rapid top-down decision-making, could revolutionize politics as we have known it until now (after training based on Schmittian philosophy, supplemented with a vigorous review of Dante's *De Monarchia* and a touch of Machiavellianism, amalgamating all this with an in-depth study of the start-up business model to consolidate the institution).

interest in investigating human nature, this marked the inevitable death of the heroic political and religious pre-secularization fervour, which had rekindled the intellectual and physical ardour of the time. Secularization has forged a docile, contractual and egalitarian West that has forgotten its own belligerent and violent roots: this spurred a downward spiral to the bloodless contemporary liberal democracies, which have trivialized conflict and violence by reducing them to entertainment (in video games, cinema, social media, TV, etc.).

While all these readings and influences combine to shape the most

prominent intellectual in America of the last twenty years, as Thiel has been described, his business activities are also in full swing: each investment in a large successful company follows another, from PayPal to Facebook (now *Meta*)³, to Palantir Technologies, a new step in Silicon Valley business. Thiel jointly runs the latter company with CEO Alex Karp⁴, his friend and past financier of the US Democratic Party. Palantir's name explicitly refers to Tolkien's famous saga *The Lord of the Rings*, one of Thiel's literary cornerstones. The company primarily deals in surveillance for the explicit benefit of the U.S. and its geopolitical

allies. Under the current circumstances, the business must change its skin and become patriotic, exclusively for the benefit of American national security. This requires, first and foremost, a sort of 'cultural revolution' in Silicon Valley: bidding farewell to the short-lived entertainment market of social platforms and reorienting its technological efforts toward American national security, excluding geopolitical adversaries from among its commercial partners. In the introduction to his emblematic book *The Technological Republic* (Chitkara, 2025), Alex Karp dwells precisely on the need for this change.

The parable of an American libertarian

The seminar on the Antichrist, held recently in San Francisco by Peter Thiel, is likely to convert Silicon Valley and establish a new cultural hegemony. The four sessions were held strictly behind closed doors, and its contents may not be shared outside those who attended. Let us begin, then, with the theme of Christian eschatology – or rather, the *logos* or hallmarks that the Bible offers us about the end of time – explicitly invoked by Thiel when he conjures up the figure of the Antichrist. There are some fundamental questions regarding the credibility of this specific reference:

What does eschatology mean in the context of contemporary capitalism? In other words, is a system that is in perpetual crisis and requires perpetual innovation compatible with a view that interprets the present from the standpoint of an ultimate end of time? Can capitalism therefore face up to its own contingency? And, finally, how can one reconcile the Christian vision of the end of times while insisting that technology will make humans immortal and eliminate death altogether?

We are faced with a striking contradiction that seems to go far beyond

any *catechon*⁵, whoever or whatever embodies it. In this religious option, what place would the *parousia* have, once humans have become immortal? It seems to go far beyond any political theology of the 20th century, whether right-wing or left-wing, into the realm of a truly different cult on a planetary scale. But to articulate this problematic picture, we need another piece to the puzzle: Peter Thiel refers to his theories by speaking precisely of political theology (Mercatus Center, 2024), explicitly citing the German jurist Carl Schmitt, his favoured point of reference in Western⁶ political philosophy. At the

³ Thiel invests in Facebook, noting that this social network faithfully reflects Girard's theory of mimetic desire and in some ways demonstrates it, because users tend to imitate each other in expressing their tastes and preferences with their likes.

⁴ Thiel met Karp at Stanford, where he graduated in law before going on to do his PhD in Frankfurt, Germany, where he had the opportunity to study and engage with the theories of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas.

⁵ The *catechon* is an enigmatic power that appears in Paul's *Second Letter to the Thessalonians*. It refers to a power that restrains or holds back the advent of evil, (the lawless man or Antichrist), preventing him from prevailing. But in doing so, it also delays the second coming of the Messiah at the end of time (or *parousia*, literally 'presence' in Greek). In addition to this theological interpretation as a force that delays the end of the world (the apocalypse), the *catechon* also has a political interpretation as a force that delays the end of human history by preventing chaos from taking over (from which the profile of some historical institution seems to emerge clearly). There is a complex and articulated debate as well as a considerable bibliography on who embodies it. There are various hypotheses, including the Holy Roman Empire, the Church itself, etc. For an essential reconstruction of this complex theological-political debate, refer to the texts of G. Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Homo Sacer II)* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); M. Cacciari *Il potere che frena* (Milan: Adelphi, 2014); AA. VV., *Il Kathécon e l'Anticristo. Teologia e politica di fronte al mistero dell'anomia* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2009)

⁶ On the uniqueness and ostentatious evidence of the concept of the West in the common Judeo-Christian roots – the ideological and rhetorical banner of the American conservative right – we note a singular misunderstanding if, in support of this dangerous ideology, the German jurist Carl Schmitt is invoked, as Peter Thiel does. In fact, no less than Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt considers Europe with ostentatious superiority to be the only authentic repository of Western tradition, which is instead vilified and sold off in the liberal version across the Atlantic. It is no coincidence that Carl Schmitt, like Martin Heidegger were supporters of Nazism, albeit in different ways, despite its biological racism, bewitched by the terrible promise of a return to purity and supremacy of European culture, as an antidote to the American liberal-democratic degeneration that was unifying the world under its rule. Schmitt therefore advocates a European West that is drastically opposed to that on the other side of the Atlantic (the offspring of Monroe's American imperial doctrine), despising the mercantile and artificial character of the liberal American West. Unless the thinking of these philosophers, who were fiercely critical of Americanism, is taken completely out of its historical context, it is difficult to drag them, as is attempted with the reactionary Catholic jurist Carl Schmitt, into the trenches of the American West without resorting to gross and instrumental interpretative distortions. With regard to the historical problematic nature of the concept of the West, refer to the reflections of the Italian political philosopher Carlo Galli.

beginning of his essay entitled Political Theology, in what is nothing less than his doctrine of sovereignty, Schmitt provided his definition of the notion:

All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy

can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in the last century (Schmitt, 2006).

Talking about Thiel as a theorist and critic of the doctrine of the state and its institutions does not seem truly compelling; rather, it seems absurd, not least because of his libertarian origins. In fact, he should not be placed in the tradition of political theology at all. Rather, it is precisely his libertarian background in its peculiar American⁷ interpretation that is key to fully understanding his self-proclaimed political theology. Despite his seemingly contradictory decision to finance the current U.S. government, Thiel's political profile

seems to be that of an uncompromising libertarian. In fact, he admits that this funding is a completely contingent and pragmatic attempt to get involved, a risk worth taking given how important the presidency is to the American mindset, which is steeped in patriotic rhetoric.⁸ Therefore, he is a libertarian who knows how to read the present situation strategically and position himself accordingly when the opportunity arises – even at a governmental level – to play his 'techno-political' game at an institutional level, with results that are ongoing. This approach is well suited to his kind of power, which is rooted in the economy and has no other foundation. Its only ethic is to attempt to make the winning move, whatever the cost.⁹

Credit and Christian eschatology

This brings us to our hypothesis: rather than a political theology, Thiel's case is better described as a form of 'capitalist religion'. To elaborate on this critical interpretation, Walter Benjamin speaks of this peculiar form of religion in his posthumous fragment entitled *Capitalism as Religion* in the following terms:

In the first place, capitalism is a purely cultic religion, perhaps the most extreme that ever existed. In capitalism, things have a meaning only in their relationship to the cult; capitalism has no specific body of dogma, no theology. It is from this point of view that utilitarianism acquires its religious overtones. This concretization of cult is connected with a second feature of capitalism: the permanence of the cult. Capitalism is the celebration of a cult sans rêve et sans merci [without dream or mercy]. There are no "weekdays". There is no day that

is not a feast day, in the terrible sense that all its sacred pomp is unfolded before us; each day commands the utter fealty of each worshipper. And third, the cult makes guilt pervasive. Capitalism is probably the first instance of a cult that creates guilt, not atonement. [...] Capitalism is entirely without precedent, in that it is a religion which offers not the reform of existence but its complete destruction. [...] Capitalism has developed as a parasite of Christianity in the West (this must be shown not just in the case of Calvinism, but in the other orthodox Christian churches), until it reached the point where Christianity's history is essentially that of its parasite – that is to say, of capitalism (Benjamin, 1996).

Thiel's self-proclaimed political theology and the esoteric and futuristic rhetoric that surrounds *Venture capital*

as a whole seem to be a by-product of the more general and ancient capitalist cult that is parasitic on Christianity, which Walter Benjamin believed to afflict modernity almost a century ago.

Further developing Benjamin's thesis, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben highlighted in the final chapter of *Creation and Anarchy* how the only theological content of the capitalist cult is 'credit' (from the Latin *creditum*, past participle of the verb *credere*). The semantic ambiguity inherent in the etymology of the noun 'credit' offers us a line of inquiry.

Faith and money appear to have an enigmatic relationship within the capitalist system.

⁷ The topic of the origin and evolution of libertarianism between Europe and the United States is extremely complex. For a concise overview, please refer to Roger-Lacan, B. (2023) *At the roots of libertarianism*, Il Grand Continent: <https://legrandcontinent.eu/it/2023/11/24/alle-radici-del-libertarismo/>.

⁸ He himself states this in an interview with New York Times journalist Ross Douthat (Douthat, 2025).

⁹ 'I would like to add something in connection with the relation between capitalism and anarchy. There is a phrase, pronounced by one of the four villains in Pasolini's *Salò*, which says: "The only true anarchy is the anarchy of power". In the same sense Benjamin had written many years before: "Nothing is so anarchic as the bourgeois order". I believe that their suggestion must be taken seriously. Benjamin and Pasolini grasp an essential characteristic of capitalism, which is perhaps the most anarchic power ever to exist, in the literal sense that it can have non *archè*, no beginning of foundation. But in this case as well the capitalist religion shows its parasitical dependence on Christian theology'. The Italian philosopher will also make it clear that any further anarchist political option must be based on this awareness (Agamben, 2019, p. 75).

Creditum is the past participle of the Latin verb credere: it is that in which we believe, in which we put our faith, when we establish a fiduciary relationship with someone by taking them under our protection or lending them money, in entrusting ourselves to their protection or taking money as a loan. In Pauline pistis there revives, then, that very ancient Indo-European institution that Benveniste has reconstructed, ‘personal loyalty’: ‘the one who holds the fidēs placed in him by a man has this man at his mercy[...].’ (Agamben, 2019, p. 59).

In the market dynamics of start-ups, the dual nature of ‘credit’ as faith and money seems even more evident: the credit invested by capital holders in an emerging idea – with the intention of monetizing it as a secondary step¹⁰ – is money invested in the innovation.

***Permanent innovation
is the only guarantee of
the system’s stability,***

a Schumpeterian thesis repeated like a mantra by Thiel, whose obsession is precisely the risk of stagnation. Investors take risks by ‘reading the signs’ of the present gain further ‘credit’, and the market begins to revolve around these investments. These investments are based on the profound conceptual and semantic ambiguity of ‘credit’ in terms of both faith and money.

The salient feature of this latest iteration of capitalism is therefore that it systematically exposes its distinctly religious character. Thus, the whole range of human emotions linked to ‘believing’ – one of the peculiar activities that defines anthropogenesis – is merchandised and fiercely parodied in the ruthless spectacle of success and failure; this places those

who observe this parable in a more or less conscious state of emotional deprivation, the causes of which they struggle to understand and identify. Capitalist cult, in its most extreme manifestation, therefore proves to be devoid of hope, except in the fictitious parameters of oscillation between success and failure, when it deprives humans of their emotional heritage and returns it parodied in the endless dynamics of the market. And if ‘faith – as we read in the famous definition of the Epistle to the Hebrews – is the substance (ousia, the technical term par excellence of Greek ontology) of things hoped for’ (Agamben, 2019, p. 70), here, we can only place our hope in money, a trivial and ferocious parody of that substance. It goes without saying that those who cannot give or receive credit – the so-called poor – may eventually be ‘assisted’ by designated institutions, but in no case can they be trusted, because having no credit, they cannot even enjoy it.¹¹

In an imaginary ‘phenomenology of capitalist cult’, we would look at the most extreme example of the cult of money. At the point of its maximum dematerialization – i.e., when money is detached from any reference to something external and real – it reveals itself as pure ‘credit’ and assumes maximum material and political pervasiveness. This process began with Nixon’s decision in 1971 to no longer allow the dollar to be converted into gold. Today, credit is traded as such, and no external use value supports this market anymore, which requires our faith to continue to exist.

Turning now to the question raised earlier regarding the credibility of the use of eschatology by such a leading exponent of contemporary capitalism as Thiel, after having characterized religion as an example of capitalist cult. Obviously, this reference now appears fictitious, because according to Benjamin’s teaching,

***The capitalist cult
knows no redemption,
no eschaton (the end
of time),***

while eschatology is precisely the story of that *eschaton*. If capitalism were to admit this, it would have to recognize a radical and effective otherness within itself. In other words, eschatology is the only ‘innovation’ in which those who practice the capitalist cult cannot truly invest, because by narrating the end of time, it defies the very permanence of the cult, opening up a historical perspective in economics and politics that is orienting them towards their finitude.

However, problems arise when custodians of the hermeneutic tradition, such as the Catholic and Reformed Churches, set aside the interpretation of eschatology. This leaves one of the two cornerstones of Christianity vacant and open to manipulation. Fictitious or fundamentalist claims can thus take root, distorting its meaning. Furthermore, doing so separates the other cornerstone of Christian dogma – the economy of salvation or divine economy unfolds in the linear time of human history – from an end with which to establish a relationship of present historical tension. In other words, Giorgio Agamben suggests that *oikonomia* – the pure divine government of men – separated from the *logos* of the end of time (i.e. eschatology) ended up providing politics with the model of pure governmental technique. It provided politics with its governmental emphasis without any additional tension beyond government (Agamben, 2011). This is the root of all contemporary political emphasis on what is now called *governance*, the management and administration of people entrusted to experts in specific fields. Therefore, the separation of these two forces running

¹⁰ Alex Karp describes this economic dynamic in a 2009 interview. ‘In Silicon Valley, we build business around an idea and then we figure out how we’re going to make money’ (Palantir Vision, 2024).

¹¹ In Douthat (2024), Thiel states that he is more oriented toward Constantine’s imperial Christianity than Mother Teresa’s charitable Christianity.

through Christianity means that they cannot be combined, which, according to the Italian philosopher's interpretation, would open up a 'space of the now-time'.¹²

Certainly, the fact that the idea of an end-time emerges from the heart of

venture capital, beyond any theoretical or theological detail, reveals the nature of the capitalist cult inherent in this theological-political concept. Furthermore, anyone who does not practice this cult, which is radically alternative to any political theology – if political theology is correctly understood as a

reflection on the theological origin of the key concepts of modern politics – i.e. anyone who does not adhere to the purely fideistic cult of 'credit' without dogmas or principles, immediately becomes an enemy. This is without even referring to the theories of the jurist Carl Schmitt.

Peter Thiel's recipe: more nationalism against a 'totalitarian world government'

Thiel's self-proclaimed political theology is confirmed to be a cult of capitalism that draws heavily on Christianity by the manner in which he delineates the *Zeitgeist* that he believes blinds us: the attempt to establish a totalitarian world government is embodied by Greta Thunberg's denunciation of climate change, for example, and it is orchestrated by those who constantly talk about the 'existential risks' posed by nuclear power, biological weapons and AI. This includes international organizations such as the UN, as well as hippies and communists. With their conformist thinking and risk aversion, these national and international actors have, at different times and in different ways, caused and consolidated economic stagnation by discouraging scientific and technological progress. In this depressing and, dare we say it, imaginary empire of risk-averse conspirators of stagnation, the only

remaining hope for investment and economic dynamism lies in AI and cryptocurrencies, both of which have emerged from the 'world of bits'.

Thiel uses two images to describe this negative worldview that he defines as 'wokeism', one is atheist and the other is Christian. Under the atheist image, *One World or None* was the title of a short black-and-white film made by a group of scientists in 1946, referring to the need for a world government for nuclear power, given the risk it entailed to the planet.¹³ Under the Christian image, summarized as 'Antichrist or Armageddon', in which the Antichrist – that is, a global government depositary of fictitious peace and salvation – is the only option left if we want to avoid Armageddon. Thiel argues that the two images are conceptually equivalent, except that the Christian one seems to make a

third way more easily conceivable by presenting the negative alternative in both of its extremes. Finally, using a third image taken from classical mythology and of Straussian inspiration, he points out that if Scylla were Armageddon and Charybdis the Antichrist, worrying about Scylla, i.e. the end of the world, implies that we forget about Charybdis, i.e. the advance of an authoritarian and global government marked by resignation and fear of the new (Hoover Institution, 2024b).

Thiel counters all this with the revival of the sovereignty of competing nation states – probably the main reason why he supports the National Conservatism movement. This model guarantees economic and technological dynamism, which can counter stagnation. It is an economic and political recipe that clearly mirrors Girard's social anthropology principle:

Social rivalry due to mimetic desire is the defining metaphysical characteristic of human societies.

■12. 'In opposition to the notion of this senseless additional time, it must be said that the only possible conception of eschatology is one that recognizes every moment as the last, and that the "already" and the "not yet" are not two chronologically distinct moments. This contradicts the theological concept of a first and second coming, which implies that these are two distinct moments. Rather, in the decisive moment – every moment – the "already" and the "not yet", the cathecon and the anomia coincide; they fall together. This coincidence creates the space of the 'now-time', the present that has lost its place between the "already" and the "not yet"' (my trans.). The context of this quotation, is part of Agamben's commentary on Paul's *Second Epistle to the Thessalonians*, found in the chapter *Storia ed escatologia. Considerazioni sull'Anticristo* in Agamben (2024).

■13. The film is also mentioned in philosopher Nick Bostrom's paper, *The Vulnerable World Hypothesis*, Global Policy, 10 (4) 2019 pp. 455-476, <https://nickbostrom.com/>, regarding the need for global governance to address the existential risks of our time, including those of a technological nature. In Thiel's view, this argument is itself the greatest existential risk we face, namely the push towards a unified world government.

Conclusions

Leaving behind the apocalyptic nature of these images, there is a tendency to identify enemies wherever anyone or anything stands in the way of the full deployment of capitalism's technical domination over the world. This includes any attempt to regulate technology (one of the most complex tasks, especially until politics abandons its own technical-governmental form). Viewing any critical debate on growth and progress as harmful indicates a refusal to accept that we live within historical limits, and that being human means existing alongside others who may see the world differently.

The first part of this paper, briefly citing the results of Giorgio Agamben's undoubtedly more complex theological genealogy of economy and government, argued that the theological oikonomic model of divine government, formerly tied to an eschatological view of the end of time, was passed on to Western politics. But once this model was detached from its eschatological horizon, Western politics kept this logic of government while losing any real sense of historical direction.

To advocate, as Thiel does, for a world increasingly driven by nations competing technically and politically to engineer the world and their borders implies an increasingly extractive

capitalism that acts as *if that historical world literally had no limits, as if it could be manipulated endlessly*. This paradoxical position is not new; it develops and exacerbates a pathology that has metastasized in advanced capitalism. This pathology has deep and distant roots, consisting of a chronic inability to question the limits of action, primarily on the basis of one's own being (ontology – the study of being – has been tragically marginalized or relegated to extremely specific contexts, primarily on philosophy).

The infinitely manipulative nature of this kind of capitalist cult comes to light when Thiel talks about the painful problem of treating degenerative diseases. He goes so far as to envisage immortality as a future technical goal, speaking of a transhumanism that would transcend physicality by embracing the whole of the human being – ultimately doing what God suggests: rising above the body by allowing its resurrection (Douthat, 2025). Instead of returning to Christian eschatology, the explicit claim to triumph over death through technology is emerging. This would free us from death, treating it as just another cumbersome obstacle on our path. The perception of limits and otherness is rendered superfluous by blind technological determinism, an ideology that asserts we will eventually

replace everything with technology. Therefore, we should proceed in exactly the same direction, accelerating and opposing anything that slows us down.

But, if it is the finitude of our being in the world and our place in history that should be rediscovered to reopen a space for thinking about politics, then Thiel's political theology moves in the opposite direction. In fact, his political proposal makes this forgetfulness intentional, because it pushes politics into an unlimited, post-historical future of infinite technical and capitalist manipulation. But why? To fuel an adrenaline-driven race between sovereign nations, each attempting to outdo others by creating an ever-more lifeless world of artificial surrogates. And among these inventions, of course, are the weapons they will use to try to win that race, whatever the cost. But then again, Thiel's political perspective is not oriented towards saving the greatest number of human and non-human beings inhabiting a historical world; he delegates this task to an imaginary techno-capitalist future in which humanity and life itself on this planet, at least in the form we have known until now, may 'transhumanistically' no longer be so essential.¹⁴ Thus, our rich diversity fades, or rather is engineered, into infinite technical refinement.

About the author

Dr Lara Caldarozzi is an independent researcher specialising in aesthetics and political philosophy. She taught Metaphysics at St John's University of Rome and also works as a translator. She obtained her PhD in Philosophy and Human Sciences from the University of Perugia, conducting the research for her doctoral thesis at MSH Paris-Nord. Her current philosophical research focuses on the relationship between philosophy, technology, and the ecological crisis.

¹⁴ When asked by conservative Catholic journalist Ross Douthat of the New York Times whether humanity should survive, Peter Thiel hesitates for a moment before finally giving a concise affirmative answer, but with certain conditions, such as the preliminary resolution of the issues discussed in Douthat (2025).

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